The Outcomes-Based War.

I must admit to a certain confusion as to the administration's strategy in Iraq at the current time. Even as more evidence mounts that the war--which I support-- has been a brilliant success in its initial execution and a qualified failure in its aftermath, a stay-the-course mentality appears to have gripped the White House.

There is still time for things to improve, and I am cautiously optimistic that the outcome will be worth the cost. But then again, so far my own personal cost has been nil. I have not fought, I have not seen the battlefield first-hand. I have not lost a friend or loved one. So that means that I have no stake in this fight, right? Well... wrong. The stakes are for all high and real, whether soldier, reporter, demonstrator or supporter.

The war itself has been thrown into the background as supporters and opponents each vie for position as to what would constitute victory or defeat. This war has become, in the parlance of mid-nineties education policy, an outcomes-based war. Simply put: the only thing that matters to many partisans is who ends up being right. If Iraq ends up democratic and at peace, the pro-war side will have their day. If the country descends into chaos, civil war and Shari'a, the anti-war crowd will bring out the I-told-you-sos.

I was locked in discussion with family members--all of whom but me are against either the Iraq war, the Afghanistan war or both--the other night. The main arguments against going into Iraq was that Afghanistan had been left to fester, or Saddam wasn't a threat and anyway he had no ties to al Qaeda, or that war is a very bad way to go about fixing things.

As to Afghanistan, the recent announcement that NATO troops will be taking over in 2006 does look a little like the old barn-door technique. What this says to me is that the US has quietly accepted that we shall be in Iraq for a lot longer than they're admitting publicly.

I won't go into the Saddam argument because no matter how much evidence there is or isn't, no one's mind is likely to be changed at this late date.

But what about war? It would not be surprising to see not a "build-down" of troops in Iraq but a significant escalation in the months ahead. With growing evidence that Iran is supplying the terror forces coupled now with Tehran's admission that it has fired up the uranium factory and is seeking an alliance with Syria, it doesn't take much to imagine a scenario where the Mullahs are either drawn into the war or jump in of their own volition. This is setting all the right people off.

There is some wisdom to this thinking. Would anyone really be shocked that the administration has decided that as war with Iran is inevitable somewhere down the road, they might as well get the thing over with once and for all? An open hot conflict with Tehran would carry a certain bookend quality to America's adventures in the Middle East since the fall of the Shah. And Bush has displayed a tendency to want to settle scores.

It is possible that the US has sufficient evidence of Syrian and Iranian meddling to claim a casus belli, although it's unlikely that the administration will take its case to the Security Council only to be met with a "fool me once" opposition. And as Tony Blair deals with his own growing insurgency, Britain might have enough on its hands to provide any support.

Then there is Saudi Arabia, which has escaped American ire for too long to be credible. Robert Baer, writing in Newsweek, suggests that Saudi Arabian jihadists are the majority of those crossing into Iraq from Iran and Syria and that this is exercising leaders from both countries. Baer writes that the danger is that the jihadists fighting in Iraq right now could decide that the battle is unwinnable and turn their attention back on the House of Saud. Or the suicide bombers could be redirected by Tehran towards Saudi Arabia which would open up the conflict to the greater Middle East.

Here Baer brings up what by now is a worn cliche about Shiite-Sunni conflict. As if Sunnis and Shiites only kill each other and not heir own. The truth is likely to be that all three regimes--Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia--are engaging in a dangerous form of gamesmanship that cuts across sectarian lines as it rages within them. And each has its own internal pressures that could lead one or all to make some sort of move.

While Syria is bowing nicely and Saudi Arabia continues its charade of being a US ally, Iran is openly saying that it intends to battle America on a global scale.

We are a week away from the constitutional deadline in Iraq. If that date holds, it will set up permanent elections in December. There are many problems with the text so far that leave many observers to wonder what sort of Iraq will be eventually made. Those waiting for the dust to settle had better act quickly and decisively. We are about to see the battled joined in terrible fashion.